In this chapter, we undertake a comparative study of the performance of local and foreign competitors' manufacturing firms in a FDI-recipient region-Guangdong Province, China-and analyzes the policy implications of the comparison for the advanced, FDI-outflow region-Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). By highlighting changes in productivity that vary with changes in manufacturing firm ownership, we reveal that domestic firms have been catching up with their foreign counterparts, including Hong Kong-based firms, though foreign firms have successfully strengthened their dominating position in Guangdong's manufacturing industry.
Introduction
Globalization-the integration of national economies into a global system-entails in part the transfer of manufacturing sectors from the industrialized world to developing countries. As Feenstra (1998) demonstrates, measured by the merchandise trade relative to value-added, the world is much more integrated than in the past. However, this ongoing global integration of industrial and trade activities brings with it the disintegration of production or business processes, whereby, to increase profits, firms seek to outsource or directly invest either domestically or abroad. The relocation of manufacturing and services spurs controversy and debate not only in the advanced countries from which the manufacturing sectors move, but also in the developing countries which receive the foreign direct investment (FDI). Leaders of advanced countries face political opposition to the unemployment that results from firms' offshoring activities (Rodrik, 1997; Schultze, 2004) . For their part, observers in FDIrecipient countries are concerned about the potentially negative effects of domination of the manufacturing sector by foreign-owned companies. Local industries in recipient countries must weather fierce competition from their foreign counterparts and face difficulties in upgrading their technological competence from the low end of the global value chain. Motivated by intense debate about these issues, this chapter undertakes a comparative study of the performance of local and foreign competitors' manufacturing firms in one such FDI-recipient region-Guangdong Province, China-and analyzes the 7 manufacturing sectors, securing China's current position as a world manufacturing center.
FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE
From Hong Kong's perspective, Guangdong is the most important investment destination in Mainland China. Since the mid 1990s, Hong Kong-based entrepreneurs have allocated almost half of their investment in China to Guangdong (see Figure 1) .
Along with the transfer of manufacturing sectors to Mainland China, economic activities in Hong Kong have been reconfigured extensively. Indeed, since the opening of China Hong Kong has transformed itself from an industrializing city into a centre of manufacturing-related service activities (Chan, 2002; Tao and Wong, 2002) . A significant proportion of Hong Kong's income has been generated by China-related trade and investment. Sun and Wong (2000) estimate that the ratio of Hong Kong's China-related trade and investment to its gross domestic product (GDP) reached 24.4 per cent in 1996.
Many scholars, in order to understand Hong Kong's economic interdependence with Guangdong, have thus far either dedicated themselves to analyzing Hong Kong's economic transition in the context of manufacturing cross-production in Guangdong (see, for example, Eng, 1997; Hollows, 1999; Kwong, et al., 2000) or focused on the two regions' economic integration from a Hong Kong perspective Ng, 1995, 2004) . Few studies have examined the changing nature of economic ties between Hong Kong and Guangdong as a function of industry dynamics in Guangdong, especially studies that discuss policy measures. Yeung's (2001 Yeung's ( , 2002 articles are exceptions in examining Guangdong industrial development by linking it to the Hong Kong factor, but they consist almost entirely of qualitative analyses. We argue that such a study of Guangdong's industry dynamics-one that not only contextualizes the nature of economic and technological ties between HKSAR and Guangdong but also does so with a view towards policy measures in one of the two regions-is necessary given the closer ties being forged between Hong Kong and southern China over the last two-and-a-half decades (particularly following the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to the People's Republic of China in 1997).
The opening-up process in southern China (featuring Special Economic Zones) catalyzed the transformation of Hong Kong's and Guangdong's industry sectors. The most striking change in Hong Kong's economy triggered by the opening-up process was that, as the role of manufacturing decreased, the services sector's role increased. At its peak in the mid-1980s, the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong employed 41.7 per cent of the active labour force, but by 1995 it employed only 15.3 per cent (Berger and Lester, 1997: 9) Hong Kong has therefore entered, particularly in the years following 1997, a period of warming economic, political, social, and cultural ties with Mainland China. Hong Kong companies, or investors operating out of Hong Kong, today employ at least 14-15 million people and own 60 000 factories in Guangdong province.
Thus the migration of production facilities to Guangdong in many ways has represented growth, rather than decline, in Hong Kong's engagement in manufacturing; for political reasons, however, such growth was categorized as outside the territory, even if it was, from a historical perspective, a reintegration into Guangdong markets. The effects on the service industries have also brought economic benefits, as most of the migration spurred further growth and increased sophistication in producer business services (Tao and Wong, 2002) .
In establishing and upgrading these networks, Hong Kong firms have exploited their traditional strategies of imitation and followership while emphasizing the development of organizational know-how rather than formal R&D for new product development.
Several surveys of electronics firms in Hong Kong have found, for example, that 60-70 per cent of such firms have succeeded by copying or modifying other products instead of initiating independent product design (Yu and Robertson, 2000) . The bulk of R&D expenditure by private firms in Hong Kong is devoted to redesigning and improving products as well as to making them easier and cheaper to produce. In other words, process innovation has often taken precedence over product innovation in Hong Kong industries. By learning extensively from their original equipment manufacturing (OEM) contacts overseas, Hong Kong firms have been instrumental in setting up and improving production facilities in Guangdong-transferring innovative production technology and management organization rather than product innovations. nonferrous metal mining, nonmetal minerals mining, electricity supply, gas supply, and water supply are also consistently reported. Private and foreign capital was however denied entry in most of these industry sectors in our observation period; therefore, we do not include these sectors in the analysis of this paper. Moreover, in various issues of Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, besides the data on state-owned, collective, shareholding, and foreign enterprises, the data on employee shareholding cooperative enterprises are reported as well. Due however to their miniscule economic scale-in 2006, their gross industrial output accounted for less than 1 percent of total gross industrial output in Guangdong-we do not include the ownership group comprised of employee shareholding cooperatives in the analysis. 3 The ownership status of a firm that operates in China is determined according to Chinese legislative regulations, when the firm registers with agencies of the Administration for Industry & Commerce. In general, a firm is classified as a foreign-funded firm only if the foreign equity stake is at or above 25 percent (the classification standard can be found in http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjbz/t20061018_402369831.htm). More detailed discussion of the classification of foreign-funded firms in China can be found in Huang, 2003, p.4 and p.35. Even though foreign firms surpassed their domestic counterparts in Guangdong in terms of output growth, domestic enterprises gained in labour productivity, which is calculated as added value divided by labour input. In 1997 foreign enterprises featured higher labour productivity than domestic firms in 20 out of 27 sectors. In many of those sectors, foreign firms' labour productivity in 1997 was twice or three times that of local enterprises. Significantly, however, domestic companies had, within 10 years, gained the lead in 16 out of 27 sectors. From 1997 to 2006, pressured by fierce competition from FDI-funded companies, domestic companies shrank in size while simultaneously 13 achieving higher labour productivity growth rates and regaining the advantage in over half of Guangdong's manufacturing sectors.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) analysis
When obtained through the growth accounting method, Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
is traditionally utilized to explain technological change at the firm, industry, and country levels. Young's paper (1995) on East Asia's fast-growing economies (including Hong Kong's) and Krugman's subsequent interpretation (Krugman, 1994) are based on total factor productivity. Their results have received much criticism, however, from scholars such as Chen (1997) , Felipe (1999) , Nelson and Pack (1999) , Rodrigo (2000) and Felipe and McCombie (2003) . Critics argue that several assumptions underlying Young's (1995) TFP growth accounting methodology-that technological progress is exogenous, disembodied, and Hick-neutral-are too far removed from reality. Critics also argue that deriving measurements from a neo-classical production function affects the consistency of the results reached in different studies. They call for policy attention to entrepreneurship, innovation, and learning in a country's effort to catch up economically. Li (1999) 
where q is the deflated added value, k is the deflated capital input, l is the labour input, and t is the time-trend variable. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the parameters of Function (1) 
With reference to Jefferson et al.'s (1992 Jefferson et al.'s ( , 1996 variable deflation methodology, which is designed particularly for Chinese industrial statistics data, we utilize the price deflators for gross industrial output reported in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook to obtain the deflated variable of added value. 5 The variable of capital input is deflated by the price indices of fixed-asset investment. The details pertaining to our variable deflation are elaborated in Table 1 . 
with adjusted R-square=0.913, F(9,1092)=1279.8, and N=1102. With the estimated coefficients of Equation (1) and Equations (4) - (8), we obtain the TFP growth of stateowned, collective, shareholding, and foreign manufacturing sectors in the period of 1997 -2006.
6 Table 2 reveals the average annual TFP growth rates for enterprises falling into the four above-mentioned ownership groups. In 25 of 27 manufacturing sectors, at least one domestic ownership group achieved faster TFP growth than did foreign firms (marked in bold text in Table 2 ). In several sectors-garments, paper, chemical products, pharmaceutical products, ferrous metals smelting, nonferrous metals, special mechanical products, transportation equipment, and instruments and office machineryall three domestic ownership groups achieved superior levels of TFP growth as compared with foreign firms. 
where α k and β l denote the elasticity of output with respect to capital and labor input, respectively, and:
According to the definitions of α k and β l and the assumption of constant returns to scale, we obtain α k,t and β l,t through the following functions: The second factor that resolves the apparent paradox is that, since the opening-up of the Chinese economy, many foreign firms have been attracted-by low manufacturing costs-to move their overseas production bases to China. A large number of such foreign firms are concentrated in the processing business, particularly in producing and exporting labour-intensive products (Huang, 2003) . These foreign firms sourced the raw materials from within China or imported critical components, hired local workers for processing and assembly, and then exported the final products to overseas markets. (Wong, 1988; Hollows, 1999) . These Shanghai industrialists concentrated on low-cost manufacturing in the labour-intensive textile and clothing industries and turned to the British trading houses in Hong Kong, which had established links with international export markets (Tsui-Auch, 1998: 9) . Over time, however, as Hong Kong's manufacturers faced limits to low-cost manufacturing, they found an escape route for their manufacturing industries in the shape of the opening up of China from 1979 onwards. This opening up enticed many of Hong Kong's manufacturers to move their operations north of Hong Kong's border so that it could exploit even cheaper land and labour resources for their production activities. Unlike other newly industrialized East Asian economies, Hong Kong's entrepreneurs, because of their linguistic and cultural familiarity, could easily leverage the abundant labour and land resources in Guangdong, instead of moving up to the global value chain, to offset the disadvantage of heightened labour costs. Enjoying the cost advantage of crossborder production in Guangdong, Hong Kong's manufacturing firms did not pursue technological sophistication as did their counterparts in other 'Asian tigers.' Automated processes were limited and R&D activities were few (Eng, 1997) . Similarly, in the early 1980s, Hong Kong was not recognized as a major source of advanced technology in Mainland China. The technology transferred through Hong Kong's FDI outflow was likely to be either low-level or quite standardized technology (Kamath, 1990) .
The idea that the growth and profitability of Hong Kong's manufacturing companies was based on lowering their factor input costs is supported by scholars in the field. For example, by conducting an empirical analysis similar to as ours, Kwong et al. (2000) finds that, during the period of 1984-1993, Hong Kong's manufacturing sector demonstrated an overall decrease in TFP, although such a technological decline did not mean lower profitability. It was during this period that Hong Kong's firms engaged in a frenzy of manufacturing facility relocation to Guangdong. Because the unfinished products shipped at low prices from the manufacturing base in Guangdong, Hong Technology' based its vision of Hong Kong's new role explicitly on science, technology, and innovation (HKSAR, 1999) . Since the publication of the Commission's two reports (HKSAR, 1998 (HKSAR, , 1999 , Hong Kong has launched a number of measures to move away from trying to increase competitiveness solely through lowering factor costs. Most notable among these measures was the establishment of the 'Innovation and Technology Fund' in 1999 with HK$5 billion, earmarked to provide funding support to projects that contribute to innovation and technology upgrading in industry, as well as to projects essential to the upgrading and development of new industries. 8 The main purpose of the ITF was to counter what scholars such as Kwong et al. (2000) and Tuan and Ng (1995) were advocating: increasing competitiveness through higher value-added goods and services.
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